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A Qualitative Reading of the Ecological (Dis)Organisation of Criminal 
Associations.  
The case of the ‘Famiglia Basilischi’ in Italy. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper combines the theoretical foundations of organisational 
ecology - one of the most important approaches in economic sociology - with 
classic criminological theories to interpret the birth, evolution and death of 
criminal associations. This mixed approach will support the interpretation of 
organised crime groups as phenomena strictly linked to the environment as 
well as to other competitors in criminal markets. This paper analyses the 
birth, evolution and death of a criminal association in Basilicata, Southern 
Italy, known as the ‘Famiglia Basilischi’. The case is exemplary of how 
ecological conditions affect the success or failure of a newly formed criminal 
association. These conditions can therefore be indicators to interpret 
organised criminal activities in similar environments.  
 
 
Background and Introduction 
 
Organised crime as a social phenomenon can be understood through 
the study of either criminal associations and networks or criminal activities 
and their enabling factors (Obokata, 2010; Paoli and Fijnaut, 2006). The 
network analysis of criminal associations is not only one of the most 
discussed topics in organised crime studies (Kenney, 2007), but it is also a 
topic that has interested organisational studies (Catino, 2014) as well as 
economics and social sciences at large. While, on one side, the literature on 
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the subject is vast and therefore difficult to summarise, on the other side, such 
richness in studies allows having a much greater selection in approaches and 
sophistication of thought. The way criminal associations organise their 
activities will necessarily depend on, and interact with, the environment in 
which they operate as well as the characters and the personalities of the 
individuals involved, within and outside the group.  
In classic criminological studies, ecological perspectives on crime 
attempt to understand the relationships between culture, behaviours, 
deviance and control strategies. For organised crime and criminal 
organisations - because the crimes involved are often serious and often 
requiring various degrees of organisation - the study of the environment 
includes considerations of the criminal market of interest and on the players 
in that market in a given area. In this perspective, ecological studies in 
criminology meet organisational studies and in particular organisational 
ecology, as evolutionary socio-economic theory. The main purpose of this 
paper is indeed to enrich criminological perspectives on criminal associations 
through a qualitative use of the framework of organisational ecology. This is a 
study on evolution of criminal groups in a competitive criminogenic 
environment.  
Organisational ecology is one of the most important approaches in 
economic sociology and is concerned with competition among organisations 
in relation to market foundation (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977). The object of the inquiry in organisation ecology is the 
organisational field and the system organisations create through their 
interactions rather than focusing on the single organisation and its 
organisation-set (Trist, 1977). Moreover, this theory is also concerned with 
‘non-market’ influences – legal, institutional elements – although these do not 
constitute the core of its interest (Beck, 2008). 
3 
 
Organisational ecology has been largely employed to investigate the 
sociology of markets as it is based on the argument that organisations develop 
on the basis of a selection process resulting from the survival of the best fit 
within given environmental conditions (Baum et al., 2006; Baum and 
Amburgey, 2002). However, this exercise has been criticised because of its 
‘Darwinian’ origin and its comparison of organisational entities to biological 
species (Beck, 2008). Indeed, (biological) evolution cannot be considered the 
core of the fate of organisations in the market, which is instead, still 
determined by more or less rational actors (Hannan and Freeman, 1989).  
Following the line of work done at the sociological level by Beck (2008), 
this paper reads organisational ecology as an evolution theory that can apply 
not only to legitimate markets but also in criminal settings. Moreover, studies 
that have looked at the position of terrorist groups in their respective markets, 
use organisational ecology to explain failure of new groups against more 
established ones (Young and Dugan, 2014). Indeed, terrorism studies have 
used the insights of organisations ecology to assess vulnerability of strategies 
and decision-making of newer groups against more established ones (Shapiro, 
2012). 
By extracting some of the theoretical foundations of organisational 
ecology and by applying them to a specific case study of a criminal 
association born and ‘dead’ in Italy – this paper explores the contribution of 
organisational ecology in criminological studies. The relevance of this work 
lies in the combination of criminology with socio-economic paradigms. 
Indeed, as organised crime groups are often found to interact also in legal 
markets, it is useful to look at organised crime through the lenses of 
organisational studies with reference to legal markets. Even though every 
market (legal and illegal) presents some degree of difference, reading the 
interactions among players in the market makes sense for organised crime 
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and mafia studies, where there are different players competing over risky 
businesses.  
While reviewing the contribution that organisational ecology can have 
for the understanding of criminal associations in criminal markets and within 
their own environment, this study is necessarily also referring to ecological 
perspectives from classical sociological studies of deviance, such as social 
disorganisation and differential association theories that see the occurrence of 
crime as interdependent on social and economic conditions within the 
environment of reference.  
The final aim of this paper is to provide an example of how criminal 
associations move in their market field as competitors and, at the same time, 
how their birth, success and death depend on the environment as much as on 
other players in the same field/market. The bottom line of this argument is 
that if organised crime or mafia groups are often considered as business-
oriented entities (Arlacchi and Ryle, 1988; Paoli, 2002; Von Lampe, 2008; 
Edwards and Gill, 2002) with prospects and means to accumulate criminal 
proceeds and alter the legal market, then it makes sense for criminological 
approaches to be merged with economic theories. This serves to investigate 
the phenomenon of organised crime and to identify and question general 
strategies and tactical choices of groups and individuals. 
In order to develop this argument and for the case study on the 
Famiglia Basilischi – a criminal association in Basilicata, Southern Italy - this 
paper shall use data collected for a completed and earlier project: selected 
excerpts from interviews with journalists and prosecutors between Calabria 
and Basilicata, media monitoring and analyses; proceedings of the two trials 
in Basilicata and of other official documents available from the National Anti-
Mafia Prosecutor Office. Data analysis is therefore based on qualitative data 
collection where different sources are analysed to better test theories and to 
facilitate the narrative of the authors. As any work based on 
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assembled/aggregated data, especially when qualitative, the study is therefore 
inherently limited as it cannot provide detailed information and will 
necessarily suffer at times from approximation and lack of specificity of 
historical narrations. However, the value of this type of qualitative analysis 
lies in the stimulation of concepts beyond their usual boundaries, which is the 
final purpose of this interdisciplinary effort.  
 
 
An Introduction to Principles of Organisational Ecology  
 
Before moving to the analysis of the case study, the basic principles 
and main features of Organisational Ecology need to be laid out, from a 
perspective that does not only serve the purposes of a criminological analysis, 
but is more inclusive for social sciences. To make this task easier and more 
effective, it is necessary to start from three main principles of organisational 
economy (Baum and Amburgey, 2002): 
  
1. Organisations and groups of organisations exhibit diversity, they 
evolve. 
2. The more environments change and present uncertainties, the more 
organisations struggle to devise and execute changes fast enough.  
3. Organisations’ births and deaths happen in the market in different 
ways according to contextual social and economic circumstances.   
 
Developing these observations, organisational ecology argues that 
changes happen at the population level and that birth and death of 
organisations – as well as their diversity - depend on populations’ attributes, 
rather than on adaptation to the market or rational choices (McKelvey and 
Aldrich, 1983; Campbell, 1965). Organisational ecology, especially in some of 
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its latest theorisations (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Aldrich, 2011) is an 
evolutionary approach to entrepreneurship that looks at change in 
organisations within certain environments. Changes in organisations reflect 
four basic economic processes that affect the life of organisations in the 
market (Baum and Amburgey, 2002): variation, selection, retention, and 
competition.  
In particular, we can understand variation as mutation (both accidental 
and planned); selection refers to the processes by which the market select 
organisations with optimal characteristics; retention refers to the quashing of 
rivals as much as to the establishment of work routines; competition, finally, 
refers to the relationship with other players in the market. In particular, 
(Aldrich, 1999) develops the idea of competition as struggle, to better indicate 
how organisations are not passive to the environment, but rather they do fight 
against environmental selection and competitors. The struggle is one of the key 
moments to understand the relationship among different organisations, even 
criminal ones, in their market of interests, as it will be addressed later in this 
paper. 
The processes of organisational ecology are differently conceived in 
conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity; ‘in a world of high uncertainty, adaptive 
efforts ... turn out to be essentially random with respect to future value’ (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984: 150). When this is the case, variations – both accidental and 
planned - need to be considered also as human behaviours (Baum, 1999). By 
focusing on these processes, Beck (2008) has argued and demonstrated that 
the theoretical foundations of organisational ecology are indeed more 
sociological than biological/rational. Organisational ecology approaches 
emphasise, on one side, the importance of the contexts for the birth, the 
evolution and the eventual failure of organisations. On the other side, they 
relate these alternatives to opportunity structures within the organisations as 
well as resource constraints and (in)ability of the leaders. Indeed, in 
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organisational ecology approaches ‘individuals do matter’ and they influence 
success, survival and death of the organisation (Baum, 1999: 72). According to 
Breslin (2008), intentions of individual entrepreneurs play a great role in the 
strategic choices and the success rates of the organisations. However, even if 
individuals are crucial, they are not the sole reason for an organisation’s 
success or failure. As said, ecological approaches insist on the importance of the 
environment, the population involved and social, economic and political 
changes. Moreover, as noted by Beck (2008), when considering a sociological 
approach to organisational ecology, it is necessary to focus on the concept of 
competition – the struggle - as determining reason for failure (or death) of 
organisations. Organisations may struggle for legitimacy or reputation in the 
market. Both the leaders, as well as the rest of the organisation’s population 
might struggle to prevail over competitors, by adjusting their strategies and/or 
their leadership (Aldrich, 1999).  
In addition, Hannah and Freeman, in their 1977 seminal paper, claim 
that the ability of organisations to adapt to increasing competitive pressures - 
due to modifications in environmental settings - are challenged by several 
internal and external barriers. These barriers might be economic or legal 
complications, prior investments by competitors, specific skills (or lack of skills) 
of staff; like in other evolution theories, unfit organisations will be 
exterminated in the field that challenges them (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 
Beck, 2008). The expulsion of unfit organisations, however, as argued by 
Barnett and Amburgey (1990) is not the outcome of competitive pressures due 
to density in the field of reference  - i.e. the number of organisations competing 
in the field – but by the (situational) mass of these organisations – the 
relationship between the weight of organisations in the market and their size, for 
which larger organisations trigger more competitive pressure. Additionally, if 
the number of organisations the environment can sustain varies over time, 
then the number of organisations that can survive in that environment also 
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varies over time (Lomi et al., 2005). In this sense, organisations within this 
ecological framework need to be understood as changing and dynamic units 
among other units.  
Evolution of strategies and changes in the environment are intertwined 
(Aldrich, 1999) and determine the sorts of individual (new) organisations. 
Organisations differ not only in size and weight, but also in their form, which 
can be generalist or specialist. Generalist organisations move in a wider 
market and enjoy more access to resources than specialist ones; this increases 
their chances of survival in the market when the environment changes. In a 
pure economic perspective, generalist organisations aim at ensuring the 
satisfaction of the majority of customers while specialist organisations adapt 
to a narrower market – meeting the preferences of a niche. Visually, one could 
imagine generalists standing in the centre of the market and specialists at the 
margins.  
 Last but not least, for a sociological outlook at organisational ecology, 
the geographical positioning of both markets and customers is significant as 
parts of the environment and its changes. This means that local conditions do 
have an impact on density, resources, populations and success or failure of 
organisations (Beck, 2008; Lomi et al., 2005; Lomi, 1995). As argued by Aldrich 
(2011: 122) organisations are relational, as entrepreneurship is ‘embedded in a 
social context, channelled and facilitated or constrained and inhibited by people’s 
positions in social networks’. The application of this mind-set to criminal 
organisations and their leaders is easily grasped. The entrepreneurial 
character of most organised crime groups together with an analysis of the 
personalities of the leaders impact strategic choices of the criminal group, as 
the case study will show. 
 In conclusion to this section, the theoretical foundations at the basis of 
organisational ecology can indeed be read in a sociological/criminological 
perspective. The importance that organisational ecology places on 
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individuals, on environmental changes, on situational mass and form of 
organisations makes it a coherent framework to understand and test success 
and failure of organisations (legal but also illegal) within a given market 
(legal and also illegal). In studying the way organisations emerge, evolve and 
die - while considering their fluctuations in competitiveness, the changes in 
social or economic contexts and the characteristics of the populations 
involved – organisational ecology assumes that everything stays in motion 
and everything changes as a product of interaction. If that is the case, then, 
looking at crime and especially criminal associations, through the lenses of 
organisational ecology allows following and understanding the changes and 
the constant motion of such social phenomena much better.  
 
 
The Environment and Criminal Organisations in Criminology  
 
Criminological theories have, on occasions, approached the study of 
organised crime groups by referring to the study of the environment. It is 
necessary to reflect on these approaches to better understand how to subsume 
criminological thinking within organisational ecology. Generally speaking, 
organised crime is understood either through a focus on the criminal 
activities committed by criminal groups or through a focus on the typology of 
structures/networks these groups adopt (Obokata, 2010; Paoli and Fijnaut, 
2006). Organised crime scholars have been considering criminal associations 
either as illicit enterprises (Paoli, 2002; Von Lampe, 2008) - therefore 
responding to rational choice models and theories (Von Lampe, 2011) - or as 
social entities  - therefore responding to social theories and social behaviours, 
within organisational studies (Kleemans and de Poot, 2008; Edwards and 
Levi, 2008). 
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Furthermore, when focusing on criminal associations, research can 
investigate people’s relationships with the environment by concentrating on 
criminogenic elements as well as on the interactions and relationships among 
individuals within a criminal group. Among theories of deviance, an example 
of the former is social disorganisation theory applied to criminal groups – as a 
study of the interactions between crime and socio-economic circumstances - 
and an example of the latter is differential association theory – as a social 
influence theory.  
Shaw and McKay’s (1942) seminal work on social disorganisation links 
the frequency of social problems – such as poverty, disease, low birth weight - 
with higher delinquency rates in certain areas of Chicago. Areas in deprived 
conditions experience a breakdown of informal social controls paired with the 
evolution of offending norms in interactions among younger people at the 
local level. This leads to crime and deviance and cultural transmission of 
delinquent values; older people in the area cannot ensure social control and 
younger people instead feed their own subculture of offending, irrespective of 
their ethnic origins. Social disorganisation theory finds the cause of 
delinquency in the criminogenic nature of the environment, rather than in 
cultural legacies. This is an aspect that clearly meets the principles of 
organisational ecology.  
Research that has followed Shaw and McKay’s version of social 
disorganisation has criticised, as well as confirmed, various aspects of the 
original work. Apart from some criticisms mostly linked to the peculiarity of 
youth crime (Sampson et al., 2002; Wikstrom and Loeber, 2000) or to the 
specifics of ethnic groups in certain urban areas (Heitgard and Bursik, 1987; 
Taylor and Covington, 1988) a fierce critique of the theory is the notion of 
‘ecological fallacy’ (Robinson, 1950) according to which social disorganisation 
bases assumptions about individual behaviours based on aggregate data. 
Moreover, even though Shaw and McKay’s research has been tremendously 
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influential in the way criminology has looked at the interactions between 
space and crime, in social disorganisation theory there is no direct mentioning 
of organised adult criminality (Lombardo, 2014). However, because of the use 
of aggregate data, this research could validate generalisable principles, thus a 
theory. In fact, the cultural transmission of delinquent values, even though 
mostly happening among youth, is also a crucial element in studies on 
traditional forms of organised crime – such as Italian mafias. In deprived 
neighbourhoods there can be a breakdown of trust in authority and thus the 
rise of counter-culture in delinquency also among adults against structures of 
power (Hope and Sparks, 2000; Von Lampe and Johansen, 2004; Gambetta, 
1993). 
If social disorganisation theory looks at how criminogenic 
characteristics of the environment can nurture delinquent cultures, 
Sutherland’s (1947) differential association theory – enriching social 
disorganisation theory - interprets the existence of deviancy through the 
study of groups in society that gravitate around illegal activities and share 
values, attitudes and criminal motives with others. Differential association 
theory is a theory of social influence as it understands crime as a learned 
behaviour mostly in group settings (Matsueda, 1988). It did set the grounds 
for studies on interaction among delinquents and their interactions in groups. 
Like social disorganisation theory, differential association theory does not 
include considerations on individual personality traits, but works on 
individual criminality as product of interaction within groups and through a 
social process. Variations in social structures and group organisation can 
explain the difference in crime rates across different groups; group processes 
explain and affect changes in crime rates over time as they are dynamic. It 
follows that groups in certain environments are necessarily interacting not 
only with each other but also with the environment itself where the culture of 
delinquency is shared and learned (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960).  
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In organised crime studies, principles from differential association 
theory have been used to study the ‘underworld’ as product of cultural 
transmission and learning. The theory has mostly been applied to the world 
of professional criminals (Hobbs, 1997) as well as maintaining its original 
focus on youth gangs and learning mechanisms (Kissner and Pyrooz, 2009). 
Also, on a general note studies on organised crime can rely on social research 
and the study of the environment to understand criminal behaviours and 
impact of criminal activities on societies. However, research often focuses on 
criminal networks, rather than criminal markets, and it analyses roles of 
offenders within networks as well as changing roles of individuals and 
groups of individuals in organised crime activities (Campana, 2011; Hobbs, 
1998; Calderoni, 2012; Coles, 2001). 
We can clearly see how criminological theories have attempted to link 
the environment and its characteristics to the formation of criminal groups 
and secondarily to organised crime studies. These theories are necessarily 
linked to social and ethnographic research and distant from the 
national/global security rhetoric that organised crime has been acquiring in 
the past two decades (Van Duyne, 2011; Edwards and Gill, 2003). It is indeed 
a complex task to combine knowledge from different criminological sources 
and approaches without encountering contradictions and dilemmas. Studies 
that have been linking the environment to the existence of criminal 
associations – as groups engaged in organised crime activities latu sensu – can 
be seen as either looking at the social and/or the economic links among 
individuals, groups and criminal activities. Organisational ecology, in this 
sense, opens another window into criminological studies to look at the 
interactions between environmental conditions and (criminal) organisations. 
This is even truer for studies on mafia groups in Italy. Mafia groups are 
types of criminal associations supported by social prestige and capable of 
infiltrating the legal economy and politics (Sciarrone and Storti, 2014). Mafia 
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is the prototypical case of criminal structures transcending class divisions and 
the divide between illegal and legal (Von Lampe, 2008). Sciarrone (2011) has 
described mafias in the South of Italy as social forces with the power to 
accumulate and employ social capital. Employing Coleman’s (1990) social 
capital definition, Sciarrone (2011: 7) defines mafia networks as social 
structures whose resources can be employed to realise ‘strategic goals’. These 
strategic goals are mostly profit-driven, even though mafia groups are 
embedded in the social environment they proliferate in and, therefore, are 
also concerned with maintaining their social status (Varese, 2011). Whether or 
not a criminal group qualifies as mafia in Italy is often a matter of judicial 
labelling. In fact, Anti-mafia laws stigmatise mafia membership very clearly 
as a stand-alone offence (article 416-bis of the criminal code). Clearly before 
mafia membership criminalisation comes an assertion (in a judicial sentence) 
of a group as mafia (Sergi, 2014). As of today, the National Antimafia 
Prosecution Office (Direzione Nazionale Antimafia) has recognised three 
named mafia groups in Italy (Cosa Nostra, ‘ndrangheta and Camorra) and 
two other ‘mafia-type’ networks, the groups formerly known as Sacra Corona 
Unita in Puglia, and the groups belonging to the (former) Famiglia Basilischi 
in Basilicata (DNA, 2014). The case study on the history of the Famiglia 
Basilischi reveals how the birth of the group, its struggles to establish its 
criminal reputation and its ‘death’ were tightly linked to the environment of 
Basilicata. In this case, a criminological analysis can help us understand how 
criminogenic the social conditions of the environment were. Also, 
criminological theory can be used to assess how likely it was for a mafia 
group to flourish in that specific environment with reference to social 
differentiation and learning of criminal values. In addition to all this, 
principles from organisational ecology support criminological analyses in 
assessing how variations in the environment, relationships with other players 
in the market, competition and struggle as well as strategic choices of the 
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leaders essentially contributed to the evolution, success and failure of the 
criminal group. The result is a composite qualitative socio-economic and 
criminological evaluation that can enhance our understanding of criminal 
association in motion within a given environment.  
 
Case Study: The Famiglia Basilischi in Italy 
 
The Environment 
 
The Basilicata region, also known as Lucania, in the South of Italy is 
one of the poorest Italian regions (Centro Studi Unioncamere della Basilicata, 
2011). It is a region of roughly 600,000 inhabitants split in two provinces - 
Potenza and Matera - where there is little or no space for investments and 
little or no space for growth (Milio and Todaro, 2013). Often considered as 
appendix either of the near Campania or Puglia or Calabria, Basilicata is far 
behind the average standard of the rest of Italy and - as it happens for other 
regions in the South of Italy – this is both cause and effect of the presence of 
criminal groups active in the area. When it comes to organised crime in 
southern Italy, echoes of mafia studies must come to mind. In order to 
understand criminal organisations in Basilicata, it is essential to consider how 
also in Basilicata mafia interests have developed and how relationships of 
local criminal groups with other neighbouring criminal groups have 
influenced the birth and death of local criminal associations.  
Crucially, Basilicata is surrounded by three regions of the South of 
Italy hosting the main Italian mafias as categorised today (DNA, 2014). To the 
north-west there is Campania with the Camorra; north-east Puglia with 
criminal groups belonging to Apulian criminal families (formerly known as 
Sacra Corona Unita); south is Calabria with the 'ndrangheta and Sicily with 
Cosa Nostra is not that far either. In particular, the fact that, geographically 
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speaking, Basilicata is in the middle among such criminal forces - especially 
the Calabrian ‘ndrangheta, today receiving growing national and 
international attention (Varese, 2011; Sciarrone and Storti, 2014) – has 
definitely been considered one of the primary reasons for the birth of 
autochthonous organised crime groups in the region (Sergi, 2003; Sergi, 2013). 
This should not come as a surprise, if one considers the conditions, which 
might lead to mafias’ growth: underdevelopment, absence of transparent 
political interests, absence of regulation in the legal markets, criminal 
opportunities and absence of already established mafia groups (Varese, 2011; 
Busso and Storti, 2011). Mafia density – a composite measure including 
investigations/trials and asset seizures for mafia offences – above and below 
Basilicata – in Calabria and Campania - has been indicated as the highest in 
the country (Calderoni, 2011; Calderoni and Caneppele, 2009). Moreover, 
Basilicata is a very small region, whose economy has never been healthy. The 
links between economic interests and criminal interests have been exposed by 
scandals regarding public administrators and local politicians, revealing a 
contaminated political environment (Sergi, 2003). Within this environment we 
find the Famiglia Basilischi, a criminal organisation made up of about 25 clans 
recently under investigation and scrutiny from anti-mafia authorities and 
labelled ‘mafia group’ in a sentence in 2007. Its birth, evolution and 
affirmation and its failures in the criminal market are symptomatic of an 
environment with high-density criminal presence as well as very weak social 
structures.   
 
The Events 
 
 The Famiglia Basilischi (simply known as ‘the Basilischi’) has been 
labelled ‘the Fifth Mafia’ in a sentence of 700 pages drafted by the judges of an 
anti-mafia maxi-trial in Potenza in 2007. The judges recognised to the group 
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the ability to both conduct illegal activities and to influence political 
outcomes, as other Italian mafias. The sentence of the first-degree trial was 
confirmed in 2012 in appeal (Sergi, 2013). For convenience of this paper, the 
period of interest for the study of the Famiglia Basilischi goes from 1994 – 
formal birth of the association - to 2012 – its judicial death.  
The family’s name comes from a movie of 1963 produced by film-
maker Lina Wertmüller titled 'I Basilischi' and set in the beautiful set of 
Matera; the movie pictured the South of Italy and a class of lazy and wealthy 
characters who lived at the edge of (il)legality. Forty-five years after the 
movie, a criminal clan has inherited that name also thanks to the assonance 
with the name of the region. Sergi (2003) demonstrated that until the 1980s 
authorities, scholars and society in general, believed that the region was 
immune from mafia crime groups. Even though the region was poor and 
underdeveloped after the Second World War, this did not systematically link 
to the evolution of mafia-type criminality. However, when after an 
earthquake in 1980 funds were allocated to the region, other criminal groups, 
such as the Calabrian ‘ndrangheta saw an opportunity to reach out for 
criminals in Basilicata and involve them in Calabrian criminal affairs (Sergi, 
2003). 
 There are at least four periods in the evolution and then involution of 
the Famiglia Basilischi. First, we have a decade of incubation of symptoms, 
which, however, falls beyond the remit of this paper as placed before the 
official birth of the association (1994). These symptoms were criminal 
activities linked to groups in other regions, recurring family names, existence 
of fake companies linked to those names to peruse European funds, evidence 
of drug dealing and extortions, homicides, arsons and violence used typically 
in mafia wars (Sergi, 2001; Gelormini, 1990; Commissione Parlamentare 
Antimafia, 1992). After various attempts from local groups during the 1980s 
to rise above others as believable mafia groups (for example the Nuova 
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Famiglia Lucana announcing its existence through newspapers in 1991) it 
became clear to the authorities of the time that criminal activities in the region 
were still in the hands of other groups, mainly the ‘ndrangheta (Sergi, 2003; 
Sergi, 2001). Calabrian clans in Basilicata acted as guarantors, by providing 
organisational tools and expertise to local criminal groups allowing them to 
participate in serious and organised criminal activities (Sergi, 2003). The 
second period is the independence, which came in 1994 when Giovanni Luigi 
Cosentino, while in prison, received authorisation from a ‘ndrangheta clan 
(the Morabito clan) to officially form the ‘Famiglia Basilischi’ as an 
autonomous mafia group. The Basilischi were formed to control criminal 
markets in Basilicata by unifying all scattered criminal groups across the 
territory and by officially affiliating members through rituals borrowed from 
the ‘ndrangheta.  
 In April 1999, the Prosecutors in Potenza issued 84 arrest warrants and 
started a maxi-trial to put behind bars all main affiliates of the organisation. 
In 2000, as the maxi-trial officially started with the charging of 38 people, the 
boss Cosentino began to cooperate with the prosecutors and revealed 
precious information about the organisation, its hierarchies, its rackets, its 
drug trafficking routes and connections, its political infiltration and its 
involvement in public and private investments (Sergi, 2013). This was the 
third important moment in the history of the Basilischi. The trial ended in 
2007, with 26 people being sentenced for mafia affiliation in the first degree. 
Even though for many that marked the end of the ‘Famiglia Basilischi’ – 
because those who were supposedly high-ranking in the Family were behind 
bars - the organisation resurged and reformed under the leadership of 
Antonio Cossidente, a sign that the bases were strong enough from the 
beginning and that mafia ideals and culture are rooted in the region (Cozzi, 
2010; Cozzi, 2014). This is the fourth period. The first-degree sentence was 
substantially confirmed when the appeals trial ended in October 2012, with 
18 
 
the conviction of 36 out of the 38 charged for crimes that happened before 
1999 (Sergi, 2012). This is the decline of the Basilischi, starting with 
Cossidente’s arrest and him becoming an informant in 2010. After 2012 the 
Basilischi have officially been dismantled (DNA, 2014). On one side other pre-
established mafia clans from Calabria and Campania have taken over 
criminal markets in Basilicata, but on the other side, more and more 
investigations lead Anti-mafia prosecutors to uncover worrying connections 
between local administrators and politicians and members of the former 
Famiglia Basilischi (Amato, 2012a; Amato, 2012b; Amato, 2012c). 
 
The Organisation 
 
 There are two moments in the life of the Famiglia Basilischi, which are 
important for understanding the organisation of the group. First, 1994, the 
year the Famiglia Basilischi was officially founded. Second, the period right 
after the first arrests, the years 2000-2012. However, what happened after 
2007-2010 (end of first trial and start of Cossidente’s cooperation with the 
authorities) cannot be fully considered as part of the Basilischi’s story (which 
were decimated by the trial), but rather a period of transition from a formal 
organisation to the current (apparent) disorganisation of criminal groups in 
Basilicata. Both periods are characterised by a binomial wave of success-
failure and are linked to different individuals sharing similar fates.  
 When the authorities first approached at the organisation of the 
Basilischi in 1999 they found what looked like a thoroughly organised 
association shaped with the rituals and the ranks of the Calabrian 
‘ndrangheta. The boss Cosentino, upon deciding to cooperate with 
prosecutors in 1999, had handed in a 20-pages code, which every 'novice' 
needed to learn by heart before taking the oath of affiliation to the criminal 
organisation. There are references to the 'five parts of the tree', a famous 
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metaphor that described the 'ndrangheta (Ciconte, 2011; Ciconte, 2015). This 
tree is divided in five parts; the trunk represents the ‘capobastone’, the boss, 
and his executive. Then, there are the branches which represent the ‘mastro di 
giornata’, the bookkeper, the ‘camorristi di sangue (blood), di sgarro 
(mistake) e di seta (silk)’, various types of mafia ministers and executioners 
(they perform extortions and retaliations through various degrees of 
violence). The twigs are the ‘picciotti’, those just recruited, and then there are 
the flowers, youth of honour, the hope of the organisation for the future. This 
metaphor, which has been accepted as the archaic structure of the Calabrian 
clans, might not necessarily mirror today’s organisational chart of the 
‘ndrangheta (Ciconte, 2015). This gives even more the idea of the fictitious 
character of the birth of the Basilischi rooted in mystical archaic rituals.  
As in every other secret society, silence and ‘omertà’ (conspiracy of 
silence) were the ‘lymph’ feeding the organisation; it is a social hierarchy. The 
Basilischi recruited members from smaller clans with the permission and the 
promise to enter bigger illegal trafficking activities - especially drugs - from 
the Calabrian families. It seems quite obvious that the easier structure to 
adopt was the model of the 'ndrine, the units of the 'ndrangheta. In its first 
period the Basilischi, therefore, were, on one side modelled upon the 
historical organisation of the Calabrian mafia, but on the other side crucially 
dependent on the figure of their boss, Cosentino, who was almost 
worshipped as he was the one who had received and earned the Basilischi’s 
independence from the Calabrians (Sergi, 2003). Interestingly, this last point – 
the worshipping of the boss - was not borrowed from the ‘ndrangheta, where 
the boss is not idolised, but rather feared and respected for his criminal 
credentials (Ciconte, 2015).  
 The judicial operations that led to the arrests in 1999 and the following 
high number of pentiti (those who decided to cooperate with authorities) 
undermined the cohesion of the association and changed the structure of the 
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Basilischi. According to the prosecutors, Antonio Cossidente, the boss who 
followed Cosentino, since 2003 – and after new investigations and further 
arrests – started offering information to the authorities to bring down some of 
his rivals around the region (DNA, 2011). At that moment, those clans of the 
‘ndrangheta involved from the start started to be afraid of repercussions and 
violent outbursts. They decided to intervene and ‘split’ the region in six areas 
of influence each represented by a person of their choice, a sub-boss 
responding to Cossidente but working for the Calabrians too (Sergi, 2013; 
DNA, 2011). The number six is typical of the way the ‘ndrangheta works: each 
locale of the ‘ndrangheta (an independent area united under a recognised 
boss) needs seven clans to be recognised (Sergi, 2012; Ciconte, 2015). By 
having only six, the Calabrian clans de facto take back the Basilischi’s 
independence and regain control over the region and its illegal market. This 
eventually left Cossidente, slowly deprived of his status, to become an 
informant in 2010 and to reveal secrets about the organisation, such as the 
connections with politics, the routes of drug trafficking, the extent of the links 
with the ‘ndrangheta and generally the way the criminal activities were 
carried out. Since 2010 other families have appeared on the territory, more or 
less linked with criminal groups from the North (in Campania), the East (in 
Puglia) and the South (in Calabria). Today’s criminal activities that used to be 
the Famiglia Basilischi’s, seem indeed undergoing massive changes not easy 
to detect for the authorities (DNA, 2014).  
 
Affiliation and Leadership  
  
 Although modern and recently formed, the heart of this mafia group is 
linked to rituals of affiliation, symbols and social codes. Rituals cement 
brotherhood and have always been one of the most mysterious and attractive 
features of Italian mafias whose members live intimately connected to their 
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groups through an enhanced sense of belonging (Ciconte, 2015; Nicaso and 
Gratteri, 2012). Like in other mafias, even in the 'Famiglia Basilischi' members 
had to pronounce an oath in front of other associates (Nicaso and Gratteri, 
2012). The oath was very similar to the one of the Calabrian 'ndrangheta and 
was a crucial moment for the criminal group. Like other mafia groups, the 
Basilischi behaved as a secret society, with esoteric rituals and requesting a 
total submission to the leader during their rituals (Sergi, 2003). Obscure 
symbols and ceremonies especially for the initiation, were the glue that bound 
the affiliates together. The rituals were solemn liturgies and a mix of old 
masonic rituals and ancient secret brotherhood oaths adapted to the needs of 
a modern organisation. Every new member taking the oath became a 'man of 
honour' for life; however out-dated these rituals might seem in our century, 
they are the start of the ‘falling in love' process and the strength of the cult of 
every mafia as group narcissism (Di Forti, 1982). As different pentiti have 
stated, the process to become a 'Basilisco' was a mystic journey (Sergi, 2003). 
Also thanks to these binding esoteric rituals, Cosentino, from prison in 1994, 
managed to bring under the same umbrella members of different and smaller 
clans everywhere in the region.  
As said, the organisation solidly relied on the charisma of the boss to 
function. Cosentino – known as ‘Angel Face’ - affiliated to both the Calabrian 
‘ndrangheta and the Camorra, is the recognised founder (Sergi, 2003). The 
establishment of the Famiglia Basilischi represented his chance to step out of 
common, ‘disorganised’ criminality and become a leader with the 
endorsement and promotion from powerful mafiosi from Calabria. His 
leadership, as seen, is only apparently successful. After only five years the 
first round of arrests maimed the organisation and Cosentino himself decided 
to ‘betray’ the Family (Amendolara, 2006c). His cooperation with justice 
however, was not the most successful either. Cosentino proved not to be a 
trustworthy pentito, as he failed to provide the authorities with any clear 
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information; he eventually received a high sentence of 21 years in prison 
(Amato, 2013b; Amato, 2013a).  
 Antonio Cossidente, who followed Cosentino’s lead in the second 
period of the Famiglia, does not appear to have been a more stable leader for 
the second generation of members of the Basilischi, as he is unable to 
resurrect the Famiglia from the ashes left by the arrests in 1999-2000 (Cozzi, 
2010; Amato, 2009). On one side, as he had been at Cosentino’s side from the 
beginning, he knew the territory and he had connections he could exploit to 
continue the Family’s business. On the other side, under his leadership the 
Family was broken down into various areas of influence under the more 
powerful leadership of the ‘ndrangheta. Cossidente attempts to strengthen 
the relationship with the Morabito clan in the ‘ndrangheta for cocaine 
trafficking while being suspected of also running the private security business 
in the entertainment industry of the area (Amendolara, 2006b; Amato, 2010; 
Amato, 2011b). However, rivalries and feuds have destroyed the last standing 
units still linked to the original core of the Famiglia Basilischi. Individual 
rivalries, such as the one between Cossidente and Saverio Riviezzi for 
example, who, from another area of influence, sought to rule the city of 
Potenza, turned the clans against each other and facilitated judiciary actions 
(Sergi, 2013; Sergi, 2012; Amendolara, 2006a). Cossidente was arrested on a 
number of occasions for different activities (from sports fraud to illegal 
gambling) and decided to officially cooperate in 2010. He gave the authorities 
information about links between politics and mafia in the region, which have 
led to more investigations that are still on-going today (DNA, 2014).  
 
Criminal Strategies and Criminal Activities 
 
 When the Anti-mafia authorities issued the 84 arrest warrants in 1999, 
among the targeted individuals there were no ostensibly wealthy people: the 
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‘Famiglia Basilischi’ seemed quite poor. Public opinion wondered whether 
that meant that the clans were not successful or that those targeted were 
principally small fish (Sergi, 2003). Nevertheless, arrest warrants kept coming 
in the following years as a sign that the actions and networks of the Family 
were more complex than it might have seemed. In general, the activities of the 
Famiglia Basilischi seemed quite eclectic and varied. 
 Indeed, the main interest of the Basilischi was to secure control over 
criminal markets in and through the region, by endorsing a cult of leadership 
and brotherhood (Amato, 2011a). The group started with ‘successful’ – and 
violent - activities typical of mafia groups: extortions, loan-sharking and 
robberies while they obtained from the ‘ndrangheta clans the permission to 
enter the drug and arms markets (DNA, 2011). Arms and drugs trafficking 
represented the ideal markets for the emancipation from the ‘ndrangheta 
mainly because of the geographical position of Basilicata that allows easy 
access to the sea towards (and from) the Balkans through the Apulian region 
(DNA, 2011). Among other activities, at the local level, beside extortion and 
loan sharking, the Family was also engaged in ecomafia activities. These 
activities were mainly related to illegal waste dumping led by the Camorra 
clans, which, also in Basilicata, detained the leadership in this field (Guardia 
di Finanza, 1996). Furthermore, the Basilischi were also involved in an 
investigation related to illegal storage of radioactive materials, solid and 
liquid waste of high nuclear activity, in cooperation with ‘ndrangheta clans 
(Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia, 1997). 
Another successful local activity relates to protection rackets, placed 
even on the carriage carrying the Madonna during the city festival in Matera 
to ensure no disturbance during the celebration (Ansa, 2000). Other local 
activities involved tampering with public contracts and investments related to 
oil deposits in Val D’Agri or the dealership of Fiat cars in Melfi (Commissione 
Parlamentare Antimafia, 1997). In particular, the investments in Val D’Agri 
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attracted both criminal organisations outside Basilicata (from Apulia, Calabria 
and Campania) as well as being of interests of the political class because of the 
oil deposits, which are a peculiarity of Basilicata. 
The clans were also offering money laundering as a service for other 
clans from Calabria and Campania (Ansa, 2001a; Ansa, 2001b). Money 
laundering in Basilicata at the time of the Basilischi was done either through 
smurfing techniques or even through counterfeited banknotes. The authorities 
discovered a printing facility in Potenza that issued American Dollars to be 
sold to Latin American drug partners (Iovino, 1999). This allowed the clans, 
on one side, to generate proceeds of crime, which then needed to be 
laundered and integrated into the regular financial system. On the other side, 
the trafficking of counterfeit currency is ‘placement of currency notes, albeit fake, 
into the regular financial stream’, which can only be done ‘through an effective 
laundering process, which not only conceals the and camouflages the origin of the fake 
currency, but also the fact that they are counterfeits’ (FATF, 2013: 25).  
Moreover, the Family was also involved in public sector fraud, for 
example against the Public Health Service, made possible, amongst other 
things, because of links with influential individuals in the public sector and in 
local politics (Iovino, 1999). Lastly, in a recent investigation in May 2015, 
prosecutors also established how Antonio Cossidente, during his leadership, 
successfully established political connections, which he then exploited for the 
elections in the city of Potenza in 2004, through exchanges of favours and 
corruption (Amato, 2015). The successful link between mafia clans and 
politics is symptomatic of the tight control of the territory that the Basilischi 
were attempting to secure.   
 
 Analysis: a qualitative assessment of the Famiglia Basilischi 
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From an organisational point of view, the Famiglia Basilischi had a 
birthday, a first death sentence, a short period of resurrection and a final 
moment of death. These are: 1994, the year of foundation; 1999, the year 84 
arrests were issued; the early 2000s when some of the clans still surviving 
were organised in areas of interests by the ‘ndrangheta; 2012, the appeal trial 
after Cossidente decides to cooperate in 2010 and local feuds have decimated 
– physically or judicially - the remaining clans. In the evolution of this 
criminal association, there is a not-so-absent protagonist, the Calabrian 
‘ndrangheta (at least some of its clans), which is arguably the reason why the 
Basilischi were born in the first place and partially the reason why they did 
not develop as promised. The table below summarises and organises the 
events related to the Famiglia Basilischi for an easier approach through the 
principles of organisational ecology merged with the classic criminological 
theories mentioned.  
 
 
Organisational 
Ecology 
Classic 
Criminological 
Theories 
Famiglia Basilischi 
Birth of the 
Organisation 
 
 
 
Social 
Disorganisation 
- 
Cultural 
Transmission 
of Mafia values 
1994: Cosentino founds the Famiglia 
Basilischi following interactions 
with Calabrian clans and after 
reading local needs. 
Geography  The environment is criminogenic. 
Smaller criminal groups already 
exist but stronger/more established 
mafia-type groups are in 
neighbouring regions. 
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Organisation Type Generalist mafia organisation 
largely adopting the existing 
successful model of the Calabrian 
‘ndrangheta. 
 
Population Differential 
Association 
- 
Social Learning 
Formal affiliation through rituals - 
imposition of shared values and 
norms. 
Individuals (Leaders) The two main leaders (Cosentino 
and Cossidente) are essential for the 
evolution/involution of the group. 
Changes in the 
(Criminal) 
Environment  
 
 
 
 
 
Variations in 
Social 
Structures 
-  
Environmental 
Interactions 
Judicial operations undermine the 
cohesion of the group, hindering its 
evolution and exposing its 
weaknesses. The Calabrian 
‘ndrangheta intervenes to regulate 
the criminal markets in Basilicata 
when the main affiliates of the 
Famiglia Basilischi are jailed. 
Competitors/Struggle The clans in Calabria (and in 
Campania) represent more 
established actors for successful 
criminal activities.  
Internal Barriers The behaviour of the boss Cosentino 
and the feuds among clans during 
the second period with Cossidente 
are detrimental to the group.  
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External Barriers  Judicial operations expose the 
weaknesses of the group at the 
strategic level. The presence of other 
specialist and generalist criminal 
groups, more experienced and 
controlling over activities in 
Basilicata makes it difficult to 
compete and to fix emerging 
problems successfully.  
Death N/A Judicial death comes in three 
moments; arrests 1999; first trial 
2007; second trial 2012. 
 
Table 1: The Famiglia Basilischi: Organisational Ecology and Criminological Theories  
 
 
 From the analysis of judicial data and journalistic events available on 
the Famiglia Basilischi, there are a number of emerging considerations to 
make related to strategies and tactics of this organised crime group. Crucially, 
the experience of the Famiglia Basilischi can be read as an unfulfilled promise 
of criminal supremacy in Basilicata. The promise was made by a stronger 
group belonging to a more established criminal organisation, the Calabrian 
‘ndrangheta. However, the (criminal) environment, the presence of more 
established competitors (among which both Camorra and different 
‘ndrangheta clans) as well as the personality of the leaders, have reduced the 
possibilities of success for this new organisation.  
 Indeed, in organisational ecology terms, the events surrounding the 
birth, evolution and decline of the Famiglia Basilischi can be summarised 
within competition frameworks. The Famiglia Basilischi was born in an area 
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which presents all the ingredients, from a socio-economic point of view, that 
have led neighbouring regions to develop autochthonous mafia groups 
(Asmundo, 2011). The environment, also poor and underdeveloped, is, 
therefore, highly criminogenic from a criminological point of view. The 
existence of small and disorganised criminal groups in the region represents 
an occasion for other mafia groups – such as the ‘ndrangheta or the Camorra 
– to invest in social capital for local and national criminal activities. When 
stronger ‘ndrangheta clans granted permission to Cosentino to form a new 
locale and independent mafia group, a first strategic error was made. The 
Basilischi are created as copycat of the stronger, larger, generalist Calabrian 
mafia. Interestingly, Aldrich (1999) argues that most new organisations take 
on the form that is prevailing in the environment at the time of foundation, 
that is to say that new enterprises tend to adopt winning models of other 
enterprises already in the market. Similarly, the creation of new organisations, 
for Aldrich (1999) responds to networks and existing relationships with other 
players, that is to say that ‘who you know’ matters in the creation and 
adoption of strategies and models when founding a new organisation. The 
relevance of these theoretical approaches for the case in object is obvious: the 
Famiglia Basilischi borrowed rituals and organisational structures from the 
winning model of the Calabrian ‘ndrangheta, which, at the same time, 
represented the direct – more established - contact of the founder of the 
Basilischi. 
 Indeed, the Famiglia Basilischi was established as a generalist mafia 
group, involved in various types of activities – from prostitution, to extortion, 
to gambling, to environmental crimes. It was however, a small size 
organisation that existed in a highly competitive and dense criminal 
environment, geographically squeezed between two (if not three, with the 
Apulian groups nearby) strong criminal groups – Camorra and ‘ndrangheta. 
Whereas on one side, it is easy to see how social learning and shared criminal 
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values can work in such an environment, it is also difficult to envisage a small 
size generalist group - fresh from independence - maintaining a strong 
position in that criminal market without a niche activity. Indeed, it is not the 
density in the criminal market, but rather the situational mass of the 
competitors that saturated the market the Basilischi were trying to dominate. 
The weight of ‘ndrangheta and Camorra together with their size, clearly 
bigger than the Famiglia Basilischi, determined the failure of the latter. The 
existence of a criminal niche for the Famiglia Basilischi could probably have 
strengthened their position against other competitors. If, for example, we look 
at the Casalesi clan in Campania, which is today one of the wealthiest clans of 
the Camorra in Campania, we find them pioneering environmental crimes in 
the region (illicit waste dumping mainly) since the 1980s, and today almost 
monopolising this field (Lavorgna, 2015). The specialisation of the Casalesi in 
this illegal practice in a very dense criminal environment has in practice 
allowed them to rise above other local clans and to progress into being one of 
the most powerful clans in Italy (Greyl et al., 2013). This is the opposite of 
what happened in Basilicata. As previously said, if visually we imagine 
generalists standing in the centre of the market and specialists at the margins 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984), in Basilicata the margins looked quite slim. 
 In addition, there are two specific aspects about the Basilischi, which 
are worth focusing on and that are strictly linked to the criminal environment 
of reference: first, the brotherhood/competition with the ‘ndrangheta clans; 
second, the behaviours of the leaders. The Calabrian ‘ndrangheta is object of 
increasing scholarship and research in and outside Italy (Varese, 2005; Dickie, 
2013; Macrì and Ciconte, 2009; Varese, 2011; Sciarrone and Storti, 2014; Sergi, 
2015b; Sergi, 2015a). The debate around the role, the structure and reach of the 
‘ndrangheta clans is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, 
it suffices to report that according to Italian national Anti-mafia prosecutors, 
the ‘ndrangheta group represents today the most advanced and successful 
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form of mafia in Italy and Europe (DNA, 2014). Some ‘ndrangheta clans, 
whose supremacy in the drug market in the South of Italy is well known, saw 
it profitable to expand to the close Basilicata region where there was no 
autochthonous mafia. The Calabrian clans have therefore lent to local 
criminals in Basilicata a start-up business model to grow independent, 
probably to keep a privileged entry in the markets in Basilicata. The 
‘ndrangheta model – consisting of rituals, specialised roles, flexibility of 
structures and aggressive access to illegal markets - is successful as the 
‘ndrangheta has replicated it on other occasions (Varese, 2011; Varese, 2005; 
Ciconte, 2010; Sciarrone, 2014). Even though the 2007 sentence against the 
Famiglia Basilischi declared that the Family had the characteristics of a mafia 
association (it was named the Fifth Mafia), nevertheless the independence of 
the Famiglia Basilischi was only fictitious. Indeed, when in 1994 Cosentino 
received the permission to form the new mafia group, the rituals, the codes of 
behaviours and the keys to access to the drug market were provided by the 
clans of the ‘ndrangheta involved in the ‘project’ of creation of an 
independent criminal supremacy in Basilicata. The new organisation was 
given the tools for the job, rather than setting up their own toolkit through 
local know-how or changing the rituals according to the characteristics of 
local groups. When after five years the wave of arrests hit the organisation, it 
became clear that there might have been autonomy but there wasn’t 
independence. Indeed, right after the first boss, Cosentino, was arrested 
alongside other key members of the association, the ‘ndrangheta intervened 
to save the remaining Basilischi and to secure its own status on the criminal 
market in Basilicata. The ‘ndrangheta - which supposedly had handed the 
leadership over local markets to Cosentino with the formation of the Famiglia 
in 1994 – has first ‘delegated’ power and afterwards acted as a guarantor 
(Sergi, 2003). The role of the ‘ndrangheta was crucial to resume mafia 
activities during the leadership of Cossidente. As described earlier, the 
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division of the region in six areas of territorial control, each with a sub-leader, 
is a clear message of the supremacy of the Calabrian clans over local ones in 
Basilicata, which could not attain independence alone in the 1990s and later 
could not stay independent either. If seven is the number to create a new 
locale, a new independent group within the ‘ndrangheta (Ciconte, 2011; Sergi, 
2013) having six units implied that the seventh remained in Calabria (Sergi, 
2012). After 2000, criminal groups in Basilicata essentially become subsidiaries 
of the ‘ndrangheta and the promise of independence under one local 
leadership was abandoned.  
 A second point to raise, linked to the one about 
autonomy/independence discussed so far, is the quality of leadership within 
the Famiglia Basilischi. Specifically with reference to the two main leaders, 
Cosentino and Cossidente, the approach to leadership in the group 
represented an internal barrier to the evolution and success of the Family. It 
seems quite obvious - by reading the rituals and the codes of the Basilischi - 
that the group was born with a clear cult of the boss. The process to become a 
Basilisco, in fact, required a voluntary subjection to the boss and the 
recognition of his supremacy in the group. While this is not something that 
had been inherited from the ‘ndrangheta (where the structure of clans is less 
formalised around the figure of the leader, see (Ciconte, 2015)), it was at the 
same time not surprising in a smaller group like the Basilischi. Furthermore, 
both Cosentino and Cossidente had the charisma to be leaders, but they 
eventually could not cope with the variations imposed on the groups by 
external factors. Cosentino becomes a pentito quite soon after being arrested. 
Cossidente becomes a pentito only in 2010; the two, however, lead two very 
different groups. The judicial attack in 1999 severely altered the criminal and 
social structure of the group by upsetting the organisation given at birth by 
Cosentino. When Cossidente took over the leadership of the remaining 
families, his behaviours undermined the unity of the group, as he enters in 
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personal feuds with Saverio Riviezzi, sub-leader of another area of influence, 
and eased the work of the authorities in dismantling other groups 
(Amendolara, 2006a; Sergi, 2012). It can be argued that the relationship 
between Cossidente and the ‘ndrangheta clans (mainly the Morabito clan) 
resembled the famous relationship between Hitler and the Vichy government 
in France during the Second World War – a puppet government controlled by 
the stronger power. Cossidente, indeed, was more concerned with his 
criminal activities in the urban area of Potenza, where he was the leader, 
rather than about his overall strategic leadership as a Basilisco boss. Cosentino 
fully personified the leader expected to act almost with hubris, as the chosen 
person to form the new group (Amato, 2011a) and, as such, he was expected 
to act in the name of the group (and failed). On the other side, Cossidente’s 
leadership was linked more to his own territory, the city of Potenza, and 
local-level criminal activities rather than to an overall strategy for the 
remaining areas of influence still under the name of the Basilischi.  
 As a concluding thought on this case study, it seems safe to say that the 
Famiglia Basilischi was a disorganised or a semi-organised organisation 
clearly linked to the sorts of the environment of Basilicata. The position of the 
Basilicata region and its proximity to other mafia groups made it possible to 
transmit mafia culture. At the same time, being so close to the ‘ndrangheta 
also allowed the Calabrian clans to interfere with the Basilischi’s business 
beyond the initial brotherhood. As a consequence, the feeble autonomy 
enjoyed by the Basilischi paired with poor leadership skills and the lack of a 
specific niche in the criminal market for the Basilischi to exploit, made it 
impossible for the group to establish its reputation as an independent mafia 
group for longer than 5 years. For all these elements - and obviously also 
because of external factors (i.e. judicial interventions) - the experiment of the 
Famiglia Basilischi has to be considered strategically flawed and tactically 
naïve.  
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Reading the Ecological (Dis)Organisation of Criminal Associations 
 
 Through a generalisation of principles from theories and the case 
study, five components of an analysis of criminal organisations between 
organisational ecology and criminological theories emerge. They are briefly 
summarised and explained below as a starting point for further research in 
the field: 
 
1. Criminogenic environment 
As seen in the case of the Famiglia Basilischi, it is justified to question the 
factors that make a certain territory more or less ‘suitable’ to develop a mafia-
type group. Social disorganisation and differential association argue how 
socio-economic circumstances do play a crucial role in shaping human 
relationships as well as in characterising the environment and in developing 
shared (criminal) culture. Poverty, street crime, economic depression and 
corruption are all elements that, among others, may facilitate the activities of 
organised crime groups. Criminogenic factors that make an environment 
particularly prone to the formation of mafia-type criminality are both 
structural and cultural. For example, the existence and strength of local 
criminal groups is a structural factor while a diffused family-based clientelism 
(Sergi, 2015b) is arguably a cultural factor. Similarly, a weak contractual 
regulation, which allows fairly easy access of criminal groups into commercial 
ventures as well as permitting the tampering with public tenders, is a 
structural weakness; proximity to already established mafia groups is a 
cultural factor. An analysis of criminogenic factors in a given environment 
also based on similar other environments, therefore, is useful to predict and 
prevent as well as better counteract criminal threats.  
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2. Autonomy/independence 
The lack of real independence from the Calabrian ‘ndrangheta has 
represented one of the main reasons why the Famiglia Basilischi has failed to 
become and maintain its status as credible mafia group. A criminogenic 
environment, like Basilicata for example, necessarily hosts other forms of 
criminality, more or less organised. It is necessary, therefore, to assess the 
degree of autonomy enjoyed in reality by local criminal groups. This can be 
done by looking at the birth of these criminal groups as well as at the 
evolution of their criminal plan. The birth of the Famiglia Basilischi is a 
strategic construction rather than a spontaneous aggregation of criminal 
players.  Ontologically, the Famiglia Basilischi is linked to the Calabrian 
‘ndrangheta especially for organisational aspects, which makes the Family 
almost a copycat of the Calabrians. To the Calabrian clans, the Basilischi owe 
their birth, probably in return for a preferential alliance granted to the 
Calabrians once the Famiglia was established. The tight links with a stronger 
group, which acted as mother, as a guarantor, as a business partner and as a 
competitor all at once, jeopardised the possibility of real independence of the 
Basilischi. Indeed, when in a given environment there is a group already 
operational for a while, the relationship between a stronger/older and a 
weaker/newer group can either be of alliance or of competition. In the case 
study of the Famiglia Basilischi, the ‘ndrangheta wishes to be an ally – and 
supports the establishment of the new group – but eventually ends up re-
gaining control over the markets. Indeed, as highlighted by Hannan and 
Freeman (1989: 245) there is a ‘liability of newness’ in organisations that attempt 
to enter a market where other groups are already established. New 
organisations are more vulnerable and without autonomy/independence it is 
very difficult to nourish bonds of trust among affiliates that do not necessarily 
perceive the feeling of belonging to a brand. In dense criminal markets, 
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moreover, new organisations cannot survive the selection process if they are 
not independent enough to strategically and quickly respond to variations.  
 
3. Competition and niche in the market 
Linked to autonomy and independence of organisations in the 
environment of reference is the weight of competitors in the field. In 
particular, competition is assessed in terms of density and saturation of the 
market – by looking at the situational mass of competitors (which is the weight 
on the market combined to size and reach of the organisation). A focus on the 
density and mass of competition is qualitative and much more reliable than a 
focus on the number of competitors, which, as a quantitative measure, does 
not capture the real space organisations occupy in the market of choice.  
Indeed, it is necessary for a newly born organisation to conquer its space in 
the market. Space in the market could either be a specialist niche of the 
market or a generalist position if the dimension of the new organisation 
allows enduring competition and internal/external challenges. In the case of 
the Famiglia Basilischi, for example, other pre-existing criminal groups 
dominate the criminal market - thus it is a saturated criminal market - but also 
these organisations are larger and more competitive. The clans of ‘ndrangheta 
have interests in Basilicata and are also generalist groups; they exploit the 
international reputation of the brand ‘‘ndrangheta’ to engage in various types 
of activities (Paoli, 2003; Sergi, 2015b; DNA, 2014). The activities of the 
Famiglia Basilischi were strategically random, occasionally 
supporting/emulating ‘ndrangheta or Camorra clans and/or engaging in a 
number of very different activities. The choice of the Basilischi to specialise in 
one or more criminal activities might have made a difference for their success 
among other competitors. The case mentioned before about the strategy of the 
Casalese clan to specialise early on in environmental crime at the point of 
monopolising the field is a clear example of this logic. 
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4. Variations in social and/ or criminal structures and external barriers 
Variations, both social and economic, do obviously affect the criminal 
environment. Factors external to the organisation might hinder as well as 
support the evolution of the organisation itself. The choices made at the 
strategic level by the leaders directly impact on the (criminal) market as well 
as suffering from fluctuations in the criminal market. More specifically, this, 
for example, can refer to competitors’ behaviours as well as to the behaviours 
of opponents, generally intended. In the case of the Famiglia Basilischi, we 
have seen how judicial (legal) interventions have severely maimed the 
efficiency of the organisation; arrests and investigations have imposed 
changes upon the group in terms of recruitment, leaderships and involvement 
in criminal activities, thus forcing modifications of the original criminal 
structure. Clearly, every organisation needs to strategically assess the best 
way to deal with potential risks outside the organisations. In a criminal 
environment, these risks are indeed linked to the exposure to legal 
prosecutions as well as the risk of being replaced by others in the criminal 
market of choice. Variations in the environment - intended as both planned 
and accidental changes – can lead to mutation in leaderships of criminal 
associations (as in the case of the Basilischi) as well as increasing the feeling of 
uncertainty of the market that, according to organisational ecology, is natural 
to every new organisation. In the first instance, changes in leadership also 
carry the risk of inadequate and/or unskilled leadership (again, the case of the 
Basilischi); in the second instance, uncertainty in the market leads to more 
‘struggle’ in devising and executing changes fast enough. This struggle may 
also lead to ambiguous strategic planning for future (criminal) activities.  
 
5. Internal barriers 
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Alongside external barriers and interferences, it is vital for a criminal 
organisation to take into consideration internal factors that can predispose the 
organisation towards failure or success and that are related to staff/members 
and leadership. In particular, acquiring the right set of skills to improve the 
position in the market, again, both in terms of staff/members and in terms of 
leadership, is a fundamental step towards success. The Famiglia Basilischi’s 
approach to leadership, centred around a formal reverence of the boss can be 
considered a strategic mistake. It was, arguably, a similar mistake to the one 
made in the late 1980s and early 1990s within Sicilian Cosa Nostra when boss 
Totò Riina (the boss of the bosses) adopted a very violent and aggressive 
strategy and could not be challenged by others who opposed his approach, 
eventually bringing the whole organisation to a deep crisis (Dalla Chiesa, 
2010).  Indeed, a more flexible approach in terms of leadership (like the one of 
the ‘ndrangheta and the Camorra) might make a difference for smaller, newer 
organisations.  
Moreover, adopting rituals and affiliation rules so resembling to the ones 
of the Calabrian ‘ndrangheta was another mistake for the Basilischi. 
Arguably, the ‘ndrangheta is different in form, size, markets and characters. 
Adopting a winning model of a pre-existing organisation without 
‘corrections’ that respect the peculiarity of the territory and of the affiliates of 
the new group is a very naïve move that condemns the newly formed group 
to failure. Indeed, the aspiration for independence in a criminal group needs 
to be paired with a strategic plan of interaction among individuals in the 
group by taking into consideration their specific needs and skills in relation to 
the environment of reference. The lack of strategic skills and the centralisation 
of the leadership position can, therefore, represent, not so trivial internal 
barriers in hindrance of success of a newly born organisation in a competitive 
market. The inability to overcome the struggle of internal challenges – as well 
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as external – might be a sign of disorganisation, which eventually is 
detrimental to the reputation of a mafia-group. 
 
 
Conclusion 
  
This paper’s first aim has been to explore the links between ecological 
approaches and organised crime. It has advocated the possibility to combine 
principles from organisational ecology, as a socio-economic approach, and 
socio-criminological theories on the links between crime and the 
environment. The paper has analysed data from a number of sources to build 
a case study on the Famiglia Basilischi, a criminal association from Basilicata, 
Southern Italy. The case study has been read through frameworks and 
principles from organisational ecology and classical studies on deviance to 
build a qualitative analysis on the organisation and/or disorganisation of 
criminal association. By departing from the events of birth, evolution and 
death of the Famiglia Basilischi, this work has looked at criminal 
organisations as groups in motion within a certain environment. Such an 
analysis of criminal groups can be successful in mafia and organised crime 
studies where research on organisations (from a structural point of view) is 
often overlooked. It is indeed very useful to understand how logics and 
rationales normally associated with legitimate organisations can still apply to 
illegitimate ones. For example, it is necessary to appreciate how illicit groups 
move across markets when the market of reference is congested because of 
more established groups present in the same area and/or market. This can be 
done by looking at competition among -  and evolution of - licit organisations, 
along the lines explored in this paper. After all, a strict divide between legal 
and illegal is neither particularly useful nor helpful. In organised crime/mafia 
settings both criminal skills and social interactions play a huge role in the 
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success of criminal activities; criminal skills and social interactions frame 
organised crime groups as dynamic. There is a lot to be learned from studies 
on organisational ecology, which sees organisations as evolving dynamic 
units in an evolving and dynamic environment.  
In conclusion, the case study from Basilicata has allowed to identify an 
outline for an ecological perspective on criminal groups from a qualitative 
and interdisciplinary point of view. Data analysis and discussion have proved 
and confirmed how criminogenic environments, autonomy/independence, 
competition, variations in structures and internal/external barriers are all 
factors that can and will influence the way groups act within criminal 
markets. Also, the way markets react to the establishment of new groups is 
linked to the characteristics of the criminal environment. This implies that 
knowledge of other players in the market, the consideration of individual 
personalities and needs as well as an awareness of social and economic 
conditions in the environment, play a crucial role in predicting organised 
criminal strategies and results. While the complexity of relations among all 
these variables might seem daunting for any analysis that aims to be 
comprehensive, this paper is an invitation to embrace complexity through a 
qualitative analysis that, albeit limited in many ways, does aim to stimulate 
further discussion on the topic.  
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